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Abstract 
 
  
 The Federal Employment Retirement System is a pension fund for federal employees 
and is managed by the United States Office of Personnel and Management (OPM).  Each 
year OPM publishes an annual Civil Service Retirement and Disabilities Fund (CSRDF) 
report that provides information on the health of the fund.  The report contains historical 
cash flows from income provided by contributions to the fund from employees, agencies, 
and the U.S. Treasury.  Additionally, the report shows actuarial valuations of the total 
liabilities owed to all current employees and annuitants.  The actuaries at OPM use their 
estimates to provide projections needed to maintain the fund.   
Currently, OPM is forecasting that agency contributions have reached the end of 
their historic growth, and will contribute a smaller percentage of total payroll in the future.  
This research shows the economic assumptions OPM is utilizing for their estimates may be 
infeasible, and fail to account for the low investment returns that the fund is currently 
receiving through their special bonds.  Additionally, the research evaluates how accurately 
OPM has projected cash flows over the last 15 annual CSRDF reports.  Finally, we provide a 
model that takes into account OPM’s prediction error to provide a more accurate prediction 
of future agency contributions.  
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PREDICTING AGENCY CONTRIBUTIONS FOR THE FEDERAL 
EMPLOYMENT RETIREMENT SYSTEM (FERS) FUND 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Government debt or deficit, shortfalls, sequestration, cost growth, and budget cuts 
are just a few of the words that have become a major part of the Department of Defense’s 
(DoD) everyday vernacular.  The complexity and cost of doing business for the Government 
continues to grow.  For this reason, tradeoffs between increasing weapons technology, operating and 
maintaining assets, and personnel are more paramount than ever.   Discretionary spending in fiscal 
year 2014 was $1.15 trillion dollars, and defense spending was 55 percent of that amount at $640 
billion.  Roughly one third ($195 billion) of defense spending is dedicated to Operation and 
Maintenance costs (O&M).  O&M appropriations fund day-to-day operations for the military, 
including maintaining equipment, training personnel, paying for health benefits, and compensating 
DoD employees and contractors.  From 2000 to 2014, funding for O&M grew by 34 percent and 
civilian compensation made up about one-third of the growth (Arthur, et al. 2014).  The ability to 
forecast that growth is important in regards to ensuring enough funding is available each year to fund 
these day-to-day operations.  When there is a shortfall in the amount budgeted versus that actual 
expense, cuts must be made to mission needs or much needed civilian personnel. 
The purpose of this research is to investigate the growth of civilian compensation, 
specifically the Federal Employment Retirement System (FERS).  The FERS fund is maintained by 
the Office of Personnel and Management (OPM), and they keep track of the financial health of the 
fund, keep historical records, determine total benefits and liabilities, as well as forecast future 
contributions needed to maintain the fund.  The fund is preserved by income from the employees, 
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their agencies, investments, and other government contributions. This research will determine how 
accurate OPM is at forecasting these variables, and model the differences in their predictions to 
actuals in order to improve the accuracy of the forecast for agency contributions. 
Background 
Over the last decade the economy has suffered due to the recession that began in 
the 2007.  This recession impacted the DoD as well, and has been a major reason for 
budgets cuts and efficiency efforts.  In 2013, the government agencies were forced to 
sequester (set a hard cap on spending), which led to approximately a 10.3% cut overall to 
the budget and impacted the civilian workforce (Harrison, 2012).  
Major Commands (MAJCOMs) must pay civilian benefits out of their Operations 
and Maintenance (O&M) appropriation.  These benefits include pay, health benefits, and 
retirement benefits.   Many of the MAJCOMs use escalation rates provided by the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to forecast and budget the cost of civilian benefits in 
the out-years (future years out from current budget).  The growth in civilian benefits have 
been much higher than the escalation rates provided by OSD and often require 
MAJCOMs to repurpose their O&M funds to cover the shortfall in their civilian pay 
account.  When the benefits exceed the budget, MAJCOMs must repurpose O&M funds 
to cover a portion of the shortfall or reduce the size of the workforce (Wrona, 2017).   
During the summer of 2016, Air Force Material Command (AFMC) proposed 
using new escalation factors for budgeting and planning purposes.  They performed 
independent analysis based on AFMC’s entire O&M workforce, and found that two key 
areas were contributing to significant civilian pay growth above OSD escalation rates: 
civilian grade growth and benefits growth (Wrona, 2017).   
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The results of their analysis showed that AFMC had experienced consistent 
General Schedule (GS) grade growth over the last 16 years with an average grade growth 
slope of .09 grades per year.  The grade growth was also universal throughout the 
Command regardless of location or Center.  Additionally, they concluded that grade 
growth could either be a product of keeping salaries competitive with the private sector or 
because of the changing educational and skill level requirements of workers in the DoD.   
Finally, their study showed that FERS is the largest benefit paid to civilians by the 
government, and had the most cost growth from 2006-2016.  Growth is projected by the 
United States Office of Personnel and Management (OPM) to level off in the percentage 
of agency contribution by 2018, and then begin to decrease around 2025 (OPM, 2016).  
Research Objective 
Agencies like Air Force Material Command use OPM’s projections to forecast 
their budgets.  Each year OPM publishes a Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund 
(CSRDF) report that describes the financial activities of the fund, as well as project future 
financial activity based off actuarial assumptions.  The objective of this research was to 
determine how accurate OPM’s actuaries have been in predicting future contributions to 
the fund as a percentage of civilian employee payroll.  The ability to forecast the civilian 
pay account will help leaders to make better decisions to effectively execute their 
missions.  The following questions best summarize the objective of this research: 
1. Will agency contributions to FERS fund continue to grow or will they 
level off in 2018 and begin to decline in 2025 as suggested by OPM 
guidance? 
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2. What Return on Investment (ROI) is the pension currently receiving and 
what rate is needed to stabilize the fund? 
Methodology 
The methodology used for this research was to gather data from past CSRDF 
annual reports, and compare projections from OPM actuaries to the actual numbers.  This 
information allowed us to take average error trends from OPM and apply them to the 
current projections from the most recent CSRDF fund.  Additionally, we used weighted 
averages to determine the pension funds current ROI.  This information was used to model 
the trend in investment income, and apply that information to whether or not agency, 
government, and employees would continue to increase their contributions. 
Scope and Limitations 
The research focused only on the future cost growth in the Civil Service Retirement 
and Disabilities fund, and the validity of OPM’s claim that it would stabilize by 2018 and 
then begin to decline by 2025.  Although time series data was obtained by OPM’s 
historical reports, this research does not primarily use the time series data to predict future 
outcomes.  Instead, we used OPM’s historical predictions and compare them to actual 
percentages to obtain their accuracy.   
Preview 
The following chapters provide a literature review, research methodology, analysis 
and research results, and finally conclusions with some further research. The Literature 
Review addresses a historical review of pensions and how the current FERS pension cash 
flows relate to issues with state and local pensions as well as pensions that have gone 
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bankrupt. The Methodology chapter describes the data that was collected, and the process 
used to analyze the data.  The Analysis and Results section reports the results of the 
research and provides a model applied to predict future agency contributions. The 
Conclusion and Recommendation chapter reviews the objectives of this research, 
discusses limitations of the study, and provides some thoughts on possible avenues for 
future research. 
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II. Literature Review 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The literature review focuses on applicable pension plans to better understand the 
health of the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund.  To do this, a thorough 
review was conducted of the history of how pensions came about; the formation of the 
Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) which eventually led to the current system, the 
Federal Employment Retirement System (FERS); and examples of other state, local, and 
private pensions.   
Pension History 
Throughout history, people have faced economic uncertainties caused by various 
facets of life.  These facets come in the form of illness, disability, old age, and death.  
Any one of these occurrences affected an individual’s ability to provide for oneself and 
family.  These misfortunes caused people to rely on the goodwill of others, or some 
method of financial security.  Economic security has come in many forms throughout the 
history of civilization.  In ancient Greece economic security was formed by storing olive 
oil, because the olive oil was very nutritious and could be kept for long periods of time 
(Social Security Administration, 2017). 
In The United States, the idea of a publically funded pension system was first 
mentioned in 1624 by Governor Sir Francis Wyatt of Virginia to compensate military 
that were wounded during battle.  Although England never passed the law, the pilgrims 
enacted a law that anyone wounded would be taken care of by the colony for the 
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remainder of his life.  During the Revolutionary War, pensions began taking new form 
when Congress was petitioned to provide not only payment for those injured in battle, 
but also an ongoing payment for life to any officer who remained in service until the end 
of the war. As a result, the first national pension law came into existence on August 26, 
1776 (Glasson, 1918). 
During the same timeframe, Revolutionary War figure Thomas Paine proposed a 
system that did not just cover military soldiers, but was intended for the entire public.  
Paine was considered one of the foreshadowers of modern social insurance.  His 
pamphlet, entitled “Agrarian Justice”, published in the winter of 1795 was a controversial 
call for the establishment of a public system of economic security for the new nation. It 
called for the creation of a system whereby those inheriting property would pay a 10% 
inheritance tax to create a special fund out of which a one-time stipend of 15 pounds 
sterling would be paid to each citizen upon attaining age 21, to give them a start in life, 
and annual benefits of 10 pounds sterling to be paid to every person age 50 and older, to 
guard against poverty in old-age (Social Security Administration, 2017). 
Pensions evolved even further during the late 19th century when private companies 
began offering retirement security.  In 1875, the American Express Company established 
the first private pension plan in the United States in an effort to create a stable, career 
oriented workforce (Workplace Flexibility, 2010).  In 1882, the Alfred Dolge Company 
placed one percent of each employee’s pay into a pension account and paid six percent 
annual interest on the account.  Mr. Dolge’s belief was, “that just as his company had to 
provide for the depreciation of its machinery, he should also ‘provide for the depreciation 
of his employees.’” Although his intent was admirable, it was only beneficial to 
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employees who maintained employment with his company. Due to labor mobility and the 
fact that only five US companies provided private pension plans by 1900, it was not a 
commonly expected benefit (Social Security Administration, 2011). 
The next two decades share a characteristic.  By 1919, over 300 private pension 
plans existed, covering approximately 15 percent of the nation’s wage and salary 
employees.  The growth of pension plans during the early part of this century was 
credited to employers wanting to attract young workers who would be loyal to the 
company, reduce turnover, and force older employees into retirement (Short, 2002).  One 
year later the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) was established for federal 
employees, and in 1935, social security was enacted. 
In 1978, Congress passed the Revenue Act of 1978 in which section 401(k) 
changed the pensions system from that point forward.  Up until then, pensions had been 
identified as a defined benefit plan.  In this type of pension, the employee would work for 
a company in order to earn some defined benefit at retirement – typically a percentage of 
pre-retirement pay.  The Revenue Act of 1978 established a defined contribution plan 
whereby the employees would have the responsibility to contribute and manage their 
own retirement.  Over time, the defined contribution plan has taken many forms for 
different types of employees: 401(k) plans for private sector employees, 403(b) plans for 
nonprofit and public education employees, 457 plans for state and municipal employees, 
and the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) for federal employees.  The traditional defined benefit 
pension has largely been replaced by the defined contribution plan because of the 
extreme cost of paying a defined benefit to an aging population (Davidson, 2016).   
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The defined contributions differs from the defined benefit by the employer matching a 
percentage of the employees pay towards retirement.  
Civil Service Retirement System 
The Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) was established through the Civil 
Service Retirement Act on May 22, 1920 as a defined benefit contributory plan for 
federal employees.  Employees share in the expenses of their retirement by contributing 
7, 7½, or 8 percent of pay to the CSRS fund.  The employing agency matches the 
employee’s CSRS contributions.  Employees may also contribute an additional portion of 
pay to the TSP, however there are no government contributions to this additional saving 
investment.  
As a condition of participation in the CSRS, participating employees are required 
to contribute a percentage of their pay to the Fund.  The current amount that CSRS 
employees contribute is 7.0 percent.  The combined 14.0 percent of pay – total from the 
employee and the agency – does not cover the service cost of a CSRS benefit. The 
service cost is the cost determined by the actuaries at OPM of what it would cost to 
provide a pension to an employee for the remainder of their lives, and possibly any 
survivor benefits.  To lessen the shortfall, the Fund receives an annual contribution from 
the U.S. Treasury that includes amounts that amortize, over a 30-year period, increases in 
the actuarial present value of accumulated plan benefits resulting from new or liberalized 
benefits, increases in pay, or extension of coverage to new employee groups. 
Additionally, the U.S. Treasury pays 5.0 percent interest on the unfunded portion of the 
actuarial present value of the static actuarial liability.  Further, the Treasury reimburses 
the Fund for the cost of benefits attributable to military service credit and certain survivor 
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annuities (OPM, 2015). 
With a large defined benefit, and a growing unfunded liability the CSRS came 
under scrutiny by employees in the late 1970s and early 1980s.   In 1985, research 
showed that CSRS had a $540 billion unfunded liability in 1982 dollars due largely to the 
strong financial incentive for federal employees to continue working until they attained 
full retirement.  Congress legislated in 1974 in the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act to raise the contribution rate to “full funding” levels which would bring the 
level of contributions to the fund from 14% to about 36% of payroll.  However, Congress 
chose only to pay the interest on the unfunded amount liability because it was less 
expensive to ignore the growing unfunded amount.  Due to the growing concerns for the 
unfunded liability, Congress established a new retirement system through the Federal 
Employees’ Retirement System Act of 1986 (Leonard, 1985). 
FERS 
Federal employees who began working for the government in 1983 or later fell 
under the Federal Employment Retirement System (FERS).  The new system was like the 
old system, but had a smaller defined benefit and now employees could take part in 
social security.  Another benefit to FERS was a defined contribution in a Thrift Savings 
Plan (TSP). 
As a condition of participation in the FERS, participating employees are required 
to contribute a percentage of their pay to the fund.  FERS employee contributions are a 
percentage of pay that is equal to the difference between the contribution rate for CSRS 
participants, as set forth above, 7.0 percent, and the Old Age, Survivors, and Disability 
Insurance (OASDI) rate, currently 6.2 percent of pay. Thus, the contribution rate for 86.3 
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percent of the FERS participants in fiscal years 2014 and 2015 is 0.8 percent of pay.  
Employing agencies must also make contributions to the Fund on behalf of their 
participating employees.  The employer contribution rate is equal to the FERS service 
cost, less the participant contribution rate (OPM, 2015).  
The unfunded liability from CSRS and FERS led to The Middle-Class Tax Relief 
and Job Creation Act of 2012, P.L. 112-96, Section 5001 - Federal Employees 
Retirement, increased by 2.3 percent for employee pension contributions for Federal 
employees entering service during calendar year 2013. The participant contribution rate 
for these FERS-Revised Annuity Employees (FERS-RAE) is 3.1 percent of pay and the 
employer contribution rate is 9.6 percent of pay in FY 2014. Unfortunately, this 
contribution was insufficient and was increased through The Bipartisan Budget Act of 
2013 (P.L. 113-67).  This act included further revisions to contribution rates required for 
FERS-Further Revised Annuity Employees (FERS-FRAE), first hired after December 
31, 2013. FERS-FRAE provides for an additional 1.3 percent increase to employee 
contribution rates. The FERS-FRAE agency contributions for non-postal employing 
agencies are generally held at the same rate as for FERS-RAE; P.L. 113-67 requires that 
FERS-FRAE contributions in excess of the normal cost be used to address the unfunded 
actuarial liability for CSRS (OPM, 2015). 
The FERS and CSRS actuarial unfunded liability is currently $804.3 billion with a 
total Present Value (PV) future benefit exceeding $2 trillion of promised obligations to 
employees.  There are currently 2.6 million active employees with only 191,000 of the 
FERS-FRAE that are contributing the higher 4.4 percent of salary toward the fund.  The 
long term economic assumptions are 3.00 percent inflation; 2.40 percent FERS annuitant 
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Cost of Living Adjustment (COLA), 3.25 percent annual general salary increases, and 
5.25 percent interest.  These assumptions provide the framework for how the future 
obligations are projected to be met under existing statutory funding provisions. The 
provisions can be seen in Table 1 and show that total obligations will be met (OPM, 
2015). 
As FERS-RAE and FERS-FRAE employees continue to grow, the cost of funding 
pensions for agencies should begin to decline according to OPM.  As total employee 
contributions increase, covering more of the normal cost of the pension, the agency 
would not need to cover as much of the normal cost.  Annual agency contributions have 
increased from 8.0 percent of payroll in 1987 to 12.7 percent in 2014.  This percentage 
growth is expected to level off in 2017 and 2018 at 14.5 percent, and then begin to 
decline in 2022.  OPM believes that this decline will be attributed to the rise in 
employees paying a higher percentage toward their pensions.  The projected flow of plan 
assets can be seen in Table 2 (OPM, 2016). 
Economist Rachel Greszler and others, seem to think that the current plan that 
OPM is using isn’t enough.  She points out that the defined benefit under FERS is still 
considerably higher than private sector plans, and DoD should move further towards a 
complete defined contribution plan.  The cost to the government would drop significantly 
if the shift was more toward a direct contribution that closely resembles private-sector 
retirement benefits (Greszler, 2016).   
According to Kendall and Kessler, federal employees have among the most 
generous retirement plans in the country, and unlike FERS, the costs of private pensions 
are generally shared evenly between employers and employees.  Their proposal is to 
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equal the amount that the employee and employer contribute to the fund, and estimate it 
would save $117 billion over 10 years and $300 billion over 20 years (Kendall, 2011). 
 
Table 1.  Present Value of Future Benefit Obligations 
 
Source: 2016 Annual CSRDF Report, Office of Personnel and Management 
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Table 2.  Projected Flow of Plan Assets 
 
Source: 2016 Annual CSRDF Report, Office of Personnel and Management 
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State and Private Pensions 
In what's believed to be a first by a public pension plan, the Northern Mariana 
Islands Retirement Fund, Saipan, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.  The public 
defined benefit plan is only 38.8% funded, thanks to low investment returns and a benefit 
structure that's been increased without raises in funding, according to the bankruptcy 
filing in the U.S. District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, a U.S. commonwealth 
consisting of three major islands in the Western Pacific.  Currently, the pension fund 
holds $268.4 million in assets, with $911 million in liabilities. (Mercado, 2012) 
Like the Northern Mariana Islands, there have been many other state, city, and 
private pensions that have had their troubles.  Since 2010, eight cities and towns have 
gone bankrupt to include: Detroit, Michigan; San Bernardino, California; Mammoth 
Lakes, California; Stockton, California; Jefferson County, Alabama; Harrisburg, 
Pennsylvania; Central Falls, Rhode Island; and Boise County, Idaho.  State troubles have 
been overwhelming nationally, with a $5.6 trillion unfunded liability for pension 
obligations.  One of the reasons for this massive debt are the poor accounting principles 
used by the states and the actuarial assumptions that were used to determine the annual 
contribution needed to fund these obligations.  Many are assuming a seven percent return 
on investment, while realizing less than four percent in most cases.  Due to the poor 
actuarial assumptions, many states have not paid the annual required contribution needed 
to keep a healthy fund (Heritage Foundation, 2016). 
Conclusion 
The development of pension plans for economic security have evolved over the 
last few centuries.  What started out as individuals saving olive oil for their own future 
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security, morphed into promises from governments, states, and private companies to pay 
a defined benefit for an indefinite period.  These defined benefit plans were soon 
discovered to be unsustainable, and many companies switched to a defined contribution 
plan.  The government has had reforms in their pension plans, but the current system has 
a large unfunded liability that may be difficult to sustain.  Additionally, they have been 
slow to morph to fully defined contribution mechanisms; many believe that the current 
FERS system still needs reform in order to pay future obligations.  The question remains 
if FERS does not reform into a defined contribution plan and investment income does not 
produce enough cash to sustain the current pension, what amount or cost will the 
employees and agencies need to maintain the difference?  
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III. Methodology 
 
Introduction 
This chapter outlines the methodology used for data collection and analysis.  First, 
we discuss the questions that the research answers.  The second section explains the data 
collection process and the purpose for using our data set.  Third, we discuss the process 
for analyzing the data. Lastly, we cover the regression model used to modify OPM’s 
forecasted variables. 
Research Questions 
The first research question we answered was will agency contributions to the 
FERS benefit continue to grow or will it level off in 2018 and begin to decline in 2025 as 
suggested by OPM guidance?  This question allowed those budgeting for civilian pay 
programs to have confidence in the percentage that OPM forecasts in their annual 
CSRDF reports.  If the models the actuaries used at OPM are accurate, then their reports 
become very useful.  If they are not accurate, can we identify trends in their predictions 
and model their inaccuracies to better predict growth?  We believe that it will continue to 
grow because the trend over the last 10 years has been constant growth.  Additionally, 
the ROI that OPM is using for their actuarial assumptions is much too high compared 
with recent investment trends.  This brings us to our second research question. 
OPM bases their predictions on an economic actuarial assumption that the pension 
fund will receive a 5.25 percent Return on Investment (ROI) on the special bonds they 
invest in.  Our second research question was to determine the actual ROI the pension is 
currently receiving and how does that effect the long term health of the fund?  The two 
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most recent CSRDF annual reports show special bonds receiving much lower returns 
than in recent years.  The bonds that were receiving returns above 5 percent are closing 
and being reinvested at rates lower than 2 percent.  Like the Mariana Islands, discussed 
in the literature review, the CSRDF is experiencing a high unfunded actuarial liability 
and suffers from low investment returns.  This research question defines what the true 
ROI the fund is receiving, and if that ROI can support the fund without increasing agency 
contributions and employee contributions above OPM’s current predictions. 
Data Collection 
The data used for this research was acquired from the annual Civil Service 
Retirement and Disabilities Fund (CSRDF) reports.  These reports cover a fiscal year 
and are published in February of the following year.  The United States Office of 
Personnel and Management (OPM) is responsible for these reports and post them to 
their website.  Currently, they only maintain the reports covering fiscal years 2012 
through 2016 on their website.  We contacted OPM by telephone and were able to 
acquire the reports from 2001 through 2011, but all the reports prior to 2001 were not 
made available.   
Although the contents of the reports change over time, the majority of the 
information is presented identically in each of the 15 documents.  Each one begins with 
a financial section that gives the statements of net assets available for benefits, 
statements of actuarial present value of accumulated plan benefits, and a schedule of 
investments. Following the financial statements, the report covers the actuarial section 
that gives general information, the actuarial valuation of the CSRDF and the 
assumptions used in their model, tables showing past and projected cash flows of the 
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CSRS and FERS displayed in dollars and as a percentage of the combined total payroll 
for all federal employees in that fiscal year.  Each report also provides tables showing 
employee population data, demographic assumptions, and plan provisions.  Finally, the 
last two reports from 2015 and 2016 have provided a breakout of the par value of all 
investments and the current interest rates that each special bond is receiving. 
Using the percentage of combined payroll helps normalize the data in order to 
compare changes from fiscal year to fiscal year.  One limitation of our research derives 
from the fact that the future cash flow percentages used by OPM are based off predicted 
payroll amounts.  Because the research was focused on future agency contribution 
percentages, this limited our ability to alleviate errors associated with projections in 
future payroll.   
The data collected from the reports was the information provided in Table 2 of 
each of the CSRDF reports.  Table 2 of the CSRDF reports delivers past and projected 
flow of plan assets of CSRS, FERS, a combination of both pensions, and it reports all of 
that data in dollars as well as percentages.  An example of their table is shown in Table 
3.  The table gives past flow of planned assets, the income, expenses, net assets at the 
end of the year, total actuarial unfunded liability, and the combined payroll of the total 
employee population.   
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Table 3.  Past Flow of Plan Assets (Combined CSRS and FERS Systems) 
 
Source: 2016 Annual CSRDF Report, Office of Personnel and Management 
 
The total income is derived from employee contributions, agency contributions, 
other government contributions, and investment income.  This income each year is 
added to the net assets once all expenses are subtracted.  The actuaries at OPM subtract 
the net assets from their assumed total net benefit that is owed to all current employees 
and annuitants to calculate the total unfunded liability.   
In order to analyze the data, we had to collect the information from this table in 
each of the 15 reports and input that information into Microsoft Excel.  Table 4 shows 
how the data was presented from each of the reports.  The information from the 2016 
report provided us with the historical information from each heading dated back to 
Fiscal Year
Employee 
Contributions
Agency 
Contributions
Other Government 
Contributions
Investment Income Total Income Total Expense
Net Assets End of 
Year
Dynamic Total UAL 
EOY
Combined Payroll
PAST FLOW
1987 4.8 5.9 17.0 15.9 43.6 (25.8) 178.7 486.0 74.2
1988 4.5 6.7 17.5 17.9 46.7 (28.3) 197.1 508.3 79.6
1989 4.5 7.3 18.1 19.4 49.3 (29.7) 216.7 548.3 83.4
1990 4.5 7.9 19.4 20.8 52.7 (31.4) 238.0 568.7 87.6
1991 4.6 8.5 21.0 22.7 56.8 (33.2) 261.6 593.8 92.3
1992 4.7 9.3 21.8 24.2 60.0 (33.2) 288.4 599.7 98.0
1993 4.7 9.7 23.0 25.5 62.9 (35.1) 317.4 540.1 100.1
1994 4.6 10.1 22.7 26.3 63.8 (36.5) 344.3 540.6 102.8
1995 4.5 9.9 23.2 28.5 66.1 (38.6) 371.3 545.8 104.9
1996 4.4 10.4 23.4 29.5 67.7 (39.9) 398.9 512.4 107.8
1997 4.4 10.7 24.5 30.9 70.4 (41.8) 427.5 505.6 109.1
1998 4.3 11.3 24.7 32.5 72.8 (43.2) 457.1 496.1 109.6
1999 4.3 11.9 24.8 32.6 73.7 (44.0) 486.8 506.6 115.7
2000 4.7 12.4 25.1 33.8 76.0 (45.2) 521.5 509.5 120.8
2001 4.4 12.9 25.4 35.2 77.9 (47.1) 548.2 510.9 125.2
2002 4.3 13.7 26.0 36.1 80.1 (48.7) 579.5 523.6 131.3
2003 4.3 14.6 21.9 37.0 77.8 (50.0) 607.1 527.1 139.3
2004 4.2 16.2 25.9 35.8 82.1 (52.0) 637.1 534.8 145.6
2005 4.1 17.2 25.9 36.3 83.5 (54.5) 665.9 576.1 151.0
2006 3.9 18.0 28.4 36.6 87.0 (57.6) 695.0 581.8 155.5
2007 3.8 17.4 31.1 37.2 89.5 (78.1)* 706.4 634.5 161.2
2008 3.7 18.8 31.0 37.3 90.8 (63.5) 733.7 674.2 168.9
2009 3.7 20.5 31.5 37.1 92.7 (67.6) 758.7 673.1 181.1
2010 3.6 22.0 33.2 36.4 95.2 (69.3) 784.6 622.3 191.0
2011 3.5 23.9 31.3 35.4 94.1 (70.3) 808.4 761.5 197.3
2012 3.3 24.5 33.1 34.0 94.8 (73.9) 829.1 789.8 196.4
2013 3.3 24.6 33.3 31.4 92.6 (77.1) 844.6 785.0 195.4
2014 3.0 24.8 35.0 30.5 93.3 (79.4) 858.6 804.3 196.0
2015 3.5 28.0 36.6 28.4 96.4 (81.7) 873.3 789.6 199.7
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1987.  In Excel, we built a tab for each title heading, and in each tab we input the actual 
information in the first column and OPM’s predictions from each year in the remaining 
columns.  This gave us the ability to compare OPM’s prediction each year with the 
actuals one year out, two years out, etc. for 15 years.  The 2015 report only provided us 
with one data point in the one year out category, while the 2001 report provided us with 
OPM’s prediction for 15 years.  We used percentages of agency contributions compared 
with total combined payroll for each tab heading in order to normalize the data. 
 
Table 4.  Actual versus Predicted Agency Contributions 
 
 
After collecting the data from each of the reports, we gathered the information on 
special bonds from the 2015 and 2016 reports to answer our second question about the ROI 
of the investment income.  The 2015 and 2016 reports were the only reports that showed a 
breakout of each special bond, the par value for the bond, the interest rate associated with 
the bond, and the date the bond matures.  This information was saved from the file of the 
Actuals 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001
2001 10.3% 9.7%
2002 10.5% 9.7% 9.7%
2003 10.5% 9.7% 9.4% 9.4%
2004 11.1% 10.2% 10.3% 9.5% 9.5%
2005 11.4% 10.6% 10.7% 10.7% 9.6% 9.6%
2006 11.6% 11.6% 10.7% 10.7% 10.8% 9.8% 9.8%
2007 10.8% 10.7% 10.8% 10.8% 10.8% 10.8% 9.9% 9.9%
2008 11.1% 11.1% 10.8% 10.9% 10.8% 10.8% 10.8% 10.0% 10.0%
2009 11.3% 11.2% 11.3% 11.0% 11.1% 10.9% 10.9% 10.9% 10.1% 10.1%
2010 11.5% 12.1% 11.4% 11.4% 11.2% 11.3% 10.9% 10.9% 10.9% 10.2% 10.2%
2011 12.1% 12.1% 12.3% 11.6% 11.6% 11.3% 11.4% 11.0% 11.0% 10.9% 10.2% 10.2%
2012 12.5% 13.3% 12.3% 12.4% 11.7% 11.7% 11.5% 11.6% 11.0% 11.0% 11.0% 10.3% 10.3%
2013 12.6% 14.2% 13.5% 12.4% 12.6% 11.9% 11.9% 11.6% 11.7% 11.0% 11.0% 11.0% 10.4% 10.4%
2014 12.7% 14.3% 14.3% 13.5% 12.6% 12.7% 12.0% 12.0% 11.7% 11.8% 11.1% 11.1% 11.1% 10.5% 10.5%
2015 14.0% 14.4% 14.4% 14.4% 13.6% 12.7% 12.8% 12.1% 12.1% 11.8% 11.9% 11.1% 11.1% 11.1% 10.5% 10.5%
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CSRDF report and was converted into Excel.  The ability to convert these two reports 
directly to Excel alleviated any error that could have potentially occurred from manually 
inputting the numbers.   
Data Analysis 
 Once we completed our data collection, we graphed the past and predicted time 
series data from the 2016 report for employee contributions, agency contributions, other 
government contributions, investment income, expenses, and the unfunded actuarial 
liability.  Plotting the information enabled us to visually see any trends in the data, as 
well as any inconsistencies in historical versus OPM’s predictions for future cash flows.   
The next step in our analysis was to find differences in OPM’s past predictions 
versus actual information by creating a function in Excel that would calculate the 
differences for each cell in Table 4.  We then calculated the mean averages for each 
category of a one year out prediction, two year out prediction, and so on.  The next step 
in our analysis was to conduct a regression on the average of each group.  We 
considered the possibility of autocorrelation in this step, but dismissed it because we 
were not calculating true time series data.  Since we were not performing regression on 
our own predictions based off of historical time series data, but on an average error of a 
predicted versus an actual occurrence, associated autocorrelation did not apply.  
After we had a regression equation for different groups, we were able to apply 
the formula for each category (employee contribution, agency contribution, etc.) to 
what OPM had predicted in the most recent report to establish an adjusted prediction 
based off OPM’s past error in predicting values.  Once we had a prediction for each 
category, we applied the new numbers to our data set to give us an updated time series 
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graph to compare with the old one. 
The next step in our analysis was to calculate the true ROI the fund is currently 
receiving from its investments.  We converted the data from the 2015 report and the 
2016 report into Excel spreadsheets, and then computed the weighted average of all 
special bonds to come up with an overall ROI for the fund.  We used this information to 
compare the actuary’s assumed 5.25 percent ROI to the currently earned ROI to see the 
difference in the efficacy of the fund over the long-term.  This information allowed us 
to deduce a scenario that would drive a need for increased agency contributions in the 
long run if the ROI remained the same indefinitely.  Additionally, we used Microsoft 
Solver to discover what ROI was needed in order to maintain the fund with an objective 
of eventually fully funding the total liability.  
Conclusion 
 This chapter describes the development of a methodology to build a model that 
allowed us to determine a more precise prediction of future cash flow contributions 
based off OPM’s prediction accuracy.  We used data from OPM’s annual CSRDF 
reports from 2001 to 2016 that show historical cash flow and what their forecasts were 
in each of those years.  We provided our methodology of finding the current ROI of the 
fund and compared that with the assumption of a 5.25 percent return to show what 
happens if the current ROI stays the same. The results of this model are now presented 
and evaluated. 
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IV. Analysis and Results 
  
Introduction 
 This chapter begins with the time series graphs displaying prediction variance over 
time in the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund (CSRDF) annual reports. Next the 
time series data showing past and projected flow from the 2016 CSRDF table categories 
are shown for consistency and feasibility analysis.  Additionally, the Return on Investments 
(ROI) from 2015 and 2016 are analyzed and “what-if” analysis is conducted on the actual 
ROI compared to the Office of Personnel and Management’s (OPM) assumption of a 5.25 
percent return.  Finally, the result of the regression outputs are given, and new trends for 
the Unfunded Actuarial Liability (UAL) and the net assets at the end of year for the next 15 
years are provided.  
OPM’s Prediction Variance 
 OPM must look at annual trends in actuals to forecast future cash flows.  We 
compared their forecasts from 2001, 2006, 2011, and 2016’s annual reports in Figure 1.  
This information allowed us to see that OPM continually updates their model to show 
future predictions.  These predictions change as the assumptions in their model change.  In 
this graph, we see that OPM is projecting that the UAL will eventually dissolve, leaving the 
pension plan fully funded.  The differences in each report show when they believed the 
UAL would reach zero as well as how high they believed the unfunded amount would go.  
Currently, the UAL is higher than any previous report predicted, but the forecast is that it 
will reach zero quicker than the 2001 and 2006 reports show.   
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Figure 1.  OPM’s Unfunded Liability Predictions over Time 
 
 OPM’s predictions of agency contributions have evolved over time as well.  Figure 
2 shows the percentage of agency contributions have been progressively pushed higher 
every 5 years past the projections from OPM’s earlier reports.  This graph highlights the 
concern and uncertainty that many agencies have with the current projections in the 2016 
report.  It is likely that agency contributions will continue to grow at the same historical 
trend.  This figure also indicates that the model OPM uses to project agency contributions 
is forcing the future amount to a smaller percentage than the current percentage.  This 
could be due to the fact that the economic assumptions haven’t been updated since 2012 
(OPM, 2016). 
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Figure 2.  OPM's Agency Contribution Predictions over Time 
 
Time Series Data Graphs 
 The data from each category was graphed as a time series to show the historical 
trends of each cash flow category, and to evaluate the feasibility of OPM’s future 
projections.  The figures in this section show employee contributions, agency 
contributions, other government contributions, investment income, total income, and 
expenses.  Furthermore, the proportion of total income is displayed to give the importance 
of each category total income.  The x-axis of each graph is displayed as a percentage of 
total combined payroll of all federal employees.  It was graphed in this manner to show the 
proportionality of each category to the others.    
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Figure 3.  Historical and Projected Employee Contributions 
 
 Employee contributions, Figure 3, showed an historically flat trend at 7.2 percent 
that began to decline in the late 1980s, and then OPM is projecting this to increase over the 
following 25 years before finally stabilizing at 4.5 percent.  The rationale for this 
projection is that as the employees under CSRS who were paying 7.2 percent were 
replaced with FERS employees who were paying the 0.8 percent, the total contribution 
from employees started to decline.  As the number of FERS-RAE (at 3.3 percent) and 
FERS-FRAE (at 4.4 percent) increased after 2013 and 2014, the decline in contributions 
will stop and begin to increase until the only active employees are the FERS-FRAE at the 
4.4 percent.  This projection is supported by the reasoning. 
 The next time-series shows agency contributions in Figure 4.  This graph shows 
historical trend in agency contribution growth as CSRS employees were replaced with 
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FERS Employees.  Under CSRS, agency contributions and employee contributions were 
set at 7 percent each.  However, under FERS agency contributions and employee 
contributions were responsible for the full normal cost of an employee determined by the 
actuaries at OPM.  That normal cost is based off demographic and economic assumptions. 
Part of the reason for the increase in agency contributions was that under FERS agencies 
now had to contribute a much higher percentage, but the other part is that the normal cost 
has increased from 2001 to 2013 three percent.  The cost of the FERS RAE and FERS 
FRAE employees are even higher though they are contributing a higher percentage as well.  
Additionally, overages that the FERS RAE and FRAE employees, along with their agency 
contributions are applied to the UAL.  As the valuations of a normal cost of an employee 
increases, so will the agency contribution required to cover those employees. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Historical and Projected Agency Contributions 
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 OPM is projecting a decline to government contributions along with a decrease to 
the unfunded liability.   The majority of what the U.S. Treasury contributes to the fund is 
based largely on the unfunded amount.  This projection hinges on the UAL trends, because 
the Treasury makes interest payments on the static UAL amounts.  Each year the Treasury 
amortizes a 30 year payment of 5% of the UAL.  The projections for other government 
contributions in Figure 5 are on an upward trend currently, since the UAL has increased.    
 
 
Figure 5.  Historical and Projected Government Contributions 
 
 The graph in Figure 6 shows investment income. The percentage of income from 
investments climbed during the period from 1979 to 1998 when interest rates on special 
bonds were high, and have been on a downwards trend since then, as the interest rates on 
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for the following years is due to OPM not updating their assumption of a 5.25 percent ROI 
since 2012.  Although the trend is going down on investment income, OPM continues to 
optimistically project that the future income investments will be high. 
 The graph showing total income in Figure 7 reflects the same gap as investment 
income.  This gap is due to the large proportion of investment income to total income.  If 
investment income continues on the same downward trend, then there is a large disparity in 
future total income that OPM is projecting.  Figures 9 and 10 both show the inputs to total 
income as a percentage of total income.  These figures illustrate the reliance of total 
income to future projection, but also show the inconsistency of future projections with 
current trends. 
 
 
Figure 6.  Historical and Projected Investment Income 
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Figure 7.  Historical and Projected Total Income 
Figure 8.  Bar Graph showing Percentage of Total Income by Category 
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Figure 9.  Percentage of total Income by Category 
 
The final time series graph show expenses in Figure 10.  Other than the large jump 
in 2007, the graph seems feasible in future projections of expenses.  The 2007 jump was 
due to a transfer of $17.1 billion to the United States Postal Service Retirement Fund as the 
two pensions split.  The red dot shows what the expense would have been without that 
transfer, and it follows the pattern of the other data points. 
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Figure 10.  Historical and Projected Expenses 
Return on Investments 
 The following analysis examines the gap created by historical cash flow in 
investment income, and the projections that OPM is forecasting.  As stated previously, 
OPM has provided a breakout of the special bonds they have invested, their par values, and 
the interest rate for each bond.  Table 5 shows the older bonds that are maturing in the next 
few years, and Table 6 shows bonds that will not mature for more than a decade.  The 
bonds covering the dates between the tables were left out for simplicity of illustrating the 
dropping interest rates.  The importance of these two tables are to show that the older 
bonds are making much higher interest rates than the current interest rates that they can be 
reinvested in. When the special bonds, valued at $80.8 billion, mature in June of 2017, they 
will be reinvested at interest rates at or below 2 percent instead of the rates closer to 5 
percent that they are currently earning. 
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  Table 5.  2016 CSRDF Schedule of Investment Bonds Maturing Short Term 
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Table 6.  2016 CSRDF Schedule of Investment Bonds Maturing Long Term 
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Table 7 shows the weighted average of the ROI in 2016 at 3.003 percent.  This value 
is much lower than the economic assumption that OPM uses for their model.  It is also 
lower than the 2015 weighted average ROI of 3.51 percent.  When referring to Table 5 and 
6, it is safe to assume that the weighted average will continue to decrease below the current 
3.003 percent, because the reinvested interest rates are much lower than three percent.  If 
investment income continues to decrease, the income losses will need to be generated from 
the other three income categories or the fund will be in jeopardy.   
 
Table 7.  Weighted Calculation of Special Bonds 
 
 
 
 
2028
30-06-28 Special Bonds 1.750% 45,794,000.00 801,395.00
30-06-28 Special Bonds 1.750% 859,726,000.00 15,045,205.00
30-06-28 Special Bonds 1.750% 6,595,220,000.00 115,416,350.00
30-06-28 Special Bonds 1.750% 47,304,780,000.00 827,833,650.00
30-06-28 Special Bonds 1.875% 936,036,000.00 17,550,675.00
30-06-28 Special Bonds 2.000% 894,601,000.00 17,892,020.00
Subtotal 56,636,157,000.00 994,539,295.00
2029
30-06-29 Special Bonds 1.875% 936,036,000.00 17,550,675.00
30-06-29 Special Bonds 2.000% 451,947,000.00 9,038,940.00
30-06-29 Special Bonds 2.000% 442,654,000.00 8,853,080.00
30-06-29 Special Bonds 2.250% 55,015,286,000.00 1,237,843,935.00
Subtotal 2.240% 56,845,923,000.00 1,273,286,630.00
2030
30-06-30 Special Bonds 1.875% 936,036,000.00 17,550,675.00
30-06-30 Special Bonds 2.000% 442,654,000.00 8,853,080.00
30-06-30 Special Bonds 2.000% 56,103,380,000.00 1,122,067,600.00
Subtotal 1.998% 57,482,070,000.00 1,148,471,355.00
2031
30-06-31 Special Bonds 1.875% 57,482,070,000.00 1,077,788,812.50
Subtotal 1.875% 57,482,070,000.00 1,077,788,812.50
SUBTOTAL 3.003% 874,136,871,000.00 26,249,556,853.75
FFB Bonds 13,023,902,000.00
Subtotal 13,023,902,000.00 13,023,902,000.00
TOTAL 887,160,773,000.00
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5.25 % ROI Versus 3.0 % ROI 
 Currently, OPM is using an economic assumption that the ROI will be 5.25 percent 
on their investment income.  That has been the assumption since the 2012 report, and 
before that it was 5.75 percent in 2010.  As shown previously, the continued assumption at 
5.25 percent is creating a gap in projected investment income to what is actually occurring.  
The model that OPM is using is showing over-inflated income that is creating a much 
higher assumed net asset at the end of each year.  Figure 11 shows what OPM is projecting 
net assets and the unfunded balance to be through 2090 at their current assumptions.  This 
model does not take into account the lower than projected investment income with a 
current ROI of three percent.  
 To take into account the lower ROI, we modeled a comparison of OPM’s predicted 
net assets at a 5.25 percent ROI to a three percent ROI.  This comparison is shown in 
Figure 12.  The net assets at three percent are reduced to zero in this scenario, but this is 
unlikely because other government contributions would not drop to zero until the unfunded 
amount was eliminated. The point of showing this graph is to prove that the fund is 
currently unsustainable with returns on investment income less than or equal to three 
percent and without increases from government contributions and potentially other sources.   
The graph in figure 13 shows what net assets would be if government contributions 
were assumed to continue at five percent of the unfunded amount with agency and 
employee contributions at OPM’s projected amounts and the ROI at three percent. We 
chose five percent as our long term assumption because it has been the historic amount that 
the U.S. Treasury has paid toward the fund.  The issue with using this amount is that other 
government contributions are only being projected by OPM to max at $50 billion at the  
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Figure 11.  Net Assets and UAL using OPM’s 5.25% ROI Projections 
 
Figure 12.  Comparison of Net Assets at EOY when using 3% ROI versus 5.25% 
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highest in one fiscal year.  At five percent other government contributions and a ROI of 
three percent, the U.S Treasury payments will grow in excess of $250 billion annually.  
The reason they haven’t grown that high is due to the unfunded liability being stabilized by 
increased employee contributions and agency contributions.  Figure 13 shows that net 
assets would continue to suffer greatly compared to OPM projections, and that amount 
includes exaggerated U.S Treasury payments. 
 Figure 14 continues with this scenario to show the unfunded liability alongside the 
net assets.  The UAL is on a trajectory of constant growth under these conditions.  Each of 
the CSRDF reports has a model that projects the UAL balance down to zero, but those 
models are taking into consideration a 5.25 percent ROI.  In order to determine at what 
percent ROI the fund would need to create a function that would reduce the UAL to zero 
 
 
Figure 13.  Comparison of Net Assets at EOY when using 3% ROI versus 5.25% and 
Gov Contributions at 5% 
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we used Microsoft Solver to calculate that ROI.  Our objective function was to reduce the 
ROI with a constraint of the unfunded amount in 2090 being less than or equal to the 
current unfunded amount.  The fund would need to receive 5.19 percent returns to create a 
parabola effect on the UAL.  The current scenerio of low returns means that other 
government contributions, agency contributions, and employee contributions must increase 
if the unfunded liability will ever be completely extinguished.  
 
 
Figure 14.  Net Assets and UAL at 3% ROI 
 
Regression Analysis 
 Once our analysis on the likelihood of agency contribution growth to stop was 
concluded, we conducted regression on OPM’s past prediction error to develop a formula 
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that would adjust their future predictions.  Table 8 shows the mean error averages that 
OPM predicted.  A negative number indicates that OPM predicted the percentage would be 
higher than the actual percentage, and a positive number indicates that OPM predicted the 
percentage would be lower than the actual percentage.  This table shows that OPM 
predicts, on average, 0.06 percent higher than the actual percentage 1 year out over the last 
15 years.  The further out they predict, the more optimistic they have been that the 
percentage would be less than what it actually has been.   
  
Table 8.  Average Error of OPM Predictions by Years Out 
 
 
Year Error Count
1 -0.060% 15
2 0.129% 14
3 0.346% 13
4 0.567% 12
5 0.736% 11
6 0.830% 10
7 0.956% 9
8 1.163% 8
9 1.414% 7
10 1.667% 6
11 2.040% 5
12 2.225% 4
13 2.433% 3
14 2.850% 2
15 3.500% 1
Agency Contributions Accuracy
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 The trend line in Figure 15 shows the average error based on how many years out 
the forecast predicts.  The formula in this graph was applied to OPM’s prediction over the 
next 15 years, and shows a linear trend that accuracy is dependent on time in how 
accurately OPM can predict the future cash flows of agency contributions.  When we 
applied these equations to OPM’s predictions, we obtained the results in Table 9.  The 
results indicate what agency contributions will be if they continued to grow at the rate that 
OPM inaccurately predicts future agency contribution percentages.  Figure 16 graphs the 
differences in historical growth, OPM’s future prediction, and the model’s prediction of 
future agency contributions.   
 
 
Figure 15.  Agency Contribution Regression Line 
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Table 9.  Agency Contribution (OPM vs Model Predicition) 
 
 
 
Figure 16.  Agency Contribution Predictions OPM vs Model 
OPM Predicted
2016 14.5% 14.3%
2017 14.6% 14.6%
2018 14.6% 14.8%
2019 14.5% 15.0%
2020 14.5% 15.2%
2021 14.5% 15.4%
2022 14.4% 15.6%
2023 14.4% 15.8%
2024 14.3% 15.9%
2025 14.3% 16.1%
2026 14.2% 16.3%
2027 14.2% 16.5%
2028 14.1% 16.6%
2029 14.0% 16.8%
2030 14.0% 17.0%
Agency Contributions
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The issue that we had using regression is that we lacked enough data points to 
spread across the trend line.  Additionally, the trend line used in the previous regression 
had 15 data points for 1 year out data, but only 1 data point for 15 years out.  When we 
performed the regression only on the next five years out we received an equation that 
modeled the percentages more closely with what OPM is projecting over the next five 
years.  This information can be seen in Figure 15 and Table 10.  
 
 
Figure 17.  Agency Contribution Regression Model Using last 5 Years 
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Table 10.  Agency Contribution based on Last 5 Years (OPM vs Model Prediction) 
 
 
Due to the discrepancy between the two models we used the average of only the 
last five years averages to compare how well OPM has done in just this five year period.  
Table 11 shows the differences between using regression on the average errors on the 
entire 15 years and just the last five years, adding averages versus using regression, and the 
differences between adding 15 year averages versus the last five years averages.  The 
results from all the models predict agency contributions continue climbing except in the 
regression model only using the last five years.  Adding the averages from a 15 year period 
and from a five year period both closely resembled the original regression model.  Of note 
the data from the last five years is still utilizing the same economic assumptions from 2012 
which does not address the issue of lower incomes from low investment returns.  
OPM Predicted
2016 14.5% 14.2%
2017 14.6% 14.3%
2018 14.6% 14.3%
2019 14.5% 14.2%
2020 14.5% 14.2%
2021 14.5% 14.2%
2022 14.4% 14.1%
2023 14.4% 14.1%
2024 14.3% 14.0%
2025 14.3% 14.0%
2026 14.2% 13.9%
2027 14.2% 13.9%
2028 14.1% 13.8%
2029 14.0% 13.7%
2030 14.0% 13.7%
Agency Contributions
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Table 11.  Agency Contribution Model Comparisons 
Agency Contributions       
  
OPM Regression 
Model using 
15 years 
Regression 
Model Using 
5 Years 
Adding 15 
Year Average 
Error 
Adding 5 
Year Average 
Error 
2016 14.5% 14.3% 14.2% 14.4% 13.6% 
2017 14.6% 14.6% 14.3% 14.7% 14.0% 
2018 14.6% 14.8% 14.3% 14.9% 14.5% 
2019 14.5% 15.0% 14.2% 15.1% 14.9% 
2020 14.5% 15.2% 14.2% 15.2% 15.2% 
2021 14.5% 15.4% 14.2% 15.3%   
2022 14.4% 15.6% 14.1% 15.4%   
2023 14.4% 15.8% 14.1% 15.6%   
2024 14.3% 15.9% 14.0% 15.7%   
2025 14.3% 16.1% 14.0% 16.0%   
2026 14.2% 16.3% 13.9% 16.2%   
2027 14.2% 16.5% 13.9% 16.4%   
2028 14.1% 16.6% 13.8% 16.5%   
2029 14.0% 16.8% 13.7% 16.9%   
2030 14.0% 17.0% 13.7% 17.5%   
 
   
Net Assets and UAL at End of Year 
 The net assets at the end of the year are shown in Figure 18, and give a more 
realistic trajectory of what the fund will be with lower investment income.  This prediction 
includes the results from the model used on employee contributions, agency contributions, 
other government contributions, and expenses.  The results show the new projection lower 
over the next 15 years than what OPM is predicting, but higher than the path of investment 
income at three percent and the other variables remained at OPM projected levels.  Figure 
19 shows the same information for the unfunded liability.
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Figure 18.  Net Assets at EOY Comparison 
 
Figure 19.  Unfunded Liability at EOY Comparison 
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Conclusion 
 This chapter provided the analysis and results of our research.  The time series data 
for employee contributions, agency contributions, unfunded liabilities, and expenses were 
justified by OPM in their CSRDF reports and their projections in those categories are 
feasible.  However, investment income proved to have a large disconnect between 
historical trends and future projections.  This gap is not supported by OPM or discussed in 
their CSRDF reports.  Our analysis also proved the actual weighted current returns of the 
fund’s investments to be 3.51 percent in 2015 and 3.003 percent in 2016.  Further, our 
analysis showed that the pension could not be sustained at returns lower than 5.19 percent 
without increases in income from other sources.  Finally, our model showed predictions 
of agency contributions based off the inaccuracy of OPM’s predictions over the past 15 
years.  The model indicates continued growth of agency contributions over the next 15 
years with agency contributions reaching 17 percent within that time – a three percent 
increase over most recent agency contributions.  
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Research Overview 
 The purpose of this research was to determine the reliability of the Office of 
Personnel and Management’s (OPM) annual Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund 
(CSRDF) report with regards to their ability to predict future agency contribution 
percentages of civilian payroll.  Agencies have the responsibility of contributing towards 
their employees pensions, but how much of that responsibility has been uncertain each 
year.  The issue becomes defining how much of their Operations and Maintenance (O&M) 
budgets do they need to program for in the upcoming years in order to fund their missions 
and the civilian workforce that supports those functions.  The information in the CSRDF 
annual reports should be helpful for agencies when they are building their budgets by 
gathering data on how many employees they have and multiplying their civilian payroll by 
the percentage that OPM provides for future years.  However, the problem has been that 
each year the percentages have grown more than what OPM’s guidance has suggested they 
would, and that has made it difficult for agencies to know how much to budget for.  The 
historical reports from OPM have suggested growth in agency contributions will level off 
by 2018 and decline in 2025. 
 This research started with two main questions.  First, to determine if the agency 
contributions would continue to grow at the rate they have grown historically, or validate 
OPM’s claim that the growth is nearing its end.  To do this we used comparisons between 
previous annual reports predictions and historical actuals to evaluate OPM’s accuracy in 
predicting future cash flows.  Second, to validate OPM’s economic assumption that the 
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fund is receiving a 5.25 percent Return on Investment (ROI), and that the ROI is sufficient 
to support the fund.  This validation was accomplished by using weighted average of the 
special bonds reported by OPM in the 2015 and 2016 annual reports.  The results of this 
analysis were provided in Chapter IV.  This chapter provides the conclusions from that 
analysis, assumptions made in order to complete the analysis, research limitations, and 
recommendations for future research. 
Conclusion 
 This research showed a large disconnect in the economic assumptions that OPM 
uses to forecast future cash flows.  The current economic assumption of a 5.25 percent ROI 
used in OPM’s model does not support a leveling off of agency contributions.  This 
research showed the fund is only receiving a 3 percent ROI on their investments, and that 
level does not allow the fund to reduce the unfunded liability.  Additionally, the investment 
income showed a large gap from the current downward trend and future projections.  This 
gap has not been addressed by OPM and discredits the future projections regarding the 
value of the fund.  If government contributions remain at 5 percent of the unfunded liability 
and investment income continues to drop below 3 percent, the employee contributions and 
agency contributions must increase to cover the shortfall.   
 The best indicator of what agency contributions will likely be in the future, in order 
to cover the shortfall, is the current historical upward trend.  We used OPM’s prediction 
error, and applied that error in our model to show a more likely scenario that agencies can 
expect in the future.  The model indicates that agency contributions will continue to grow 
past the current 14.6 percent that OPM is using and be closer to 17 percent in the next 15 
years.   
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Assumptions and Limitations 
 The research was limited to the CSRDF and the information provided therein.  
Initially, it was our hope to recreate OPM’s model using all of their actuarial assumptions, 
but that proved too difficult to accomplish in the timeframe we had.  This inability to 
reproduce OPM’s assumptions caused us to make assumptions that the actuaries at OPM 
were using the right parameters when calculating future liabilities of the pension.  We had 
to make an assumption that the total liability was accurate, and we based our model on that 
information.  Additionally, we assumed that the U.S. Treasury would continue to make 5 
percent interest payments towards the static unfunded liability so long as there continued to 
be an unfunded amount.  We also concluded that OPM’s objective was to fully fund the 
pension, because each report had the unfunded amount going to zero in their models.  
Finally, the model was limited by the number of observations in the database.   
Recommendations for Future Research 
 The scope of this research was focused on the growth of agency contributions 
towards the Federal Employment Retirement Fund (FERS).  This research provided a 
better estimate of agency contributions for the next 15 years, but future research could 
improve the accuracy of these results by collecting more annual CSRDF reports.  The 
additional data would improve the regression line, and give a better prediction of agency 
contributions.  Future research in this area could also delve into OPM’s model itself to 
provide confidence intervals to what the lower and upper bounds of future growth in 
agency contributions could be.  Finally, this research could be expanded by investigating 
cost growth in employee healthcare benefits which was the second leading cause of cost 
growth in civilian pay.  
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